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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 1, 2009, AFTERNOON
SESSION

REF: A. STATE 50910
[1](#)B. 08 MOSCOW 3720
[1](#)C. MOSCOW 1331

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-002.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 1, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:10 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The U.S. and Russian Delegations to the START Follow-on Negotiations continued discussions initiated earlier in the day. Russia presented detailed comments on the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the START Follow-on Treaty" (REF A) that had been provided in Moscow in May 2009. Russia continued to object to U.S. plans to deploy conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and stated that non-nuclear warheads should be included within the warhead limits of the new treaty. The Russian Delegation stated that U.S. proposals were vague regarding limitations for deployed missiles and associated verification. Moreover, there should be no special limitations or verification provisions with regard to mobile missiles. The Russians again reiterated their position that the U.S. Portal Monitoring Facility at Votkinsk would be closed by December 5, 2009. The Russian

Delegation also stated that START telemetry provisions should not be preserved under the new treaty. With regard to the Moscow Treaty, Russia believed it should be superseded by the new treaty.

14. (S) The Russian Delegation again raised concerns about the security assurances that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have sought, and their desire to participate in the START Follow-on Negotiations. The Russians believed the United States and Russia should present a joint position to these countries, but that security assurances beyond those already provided were not warranted, although they could be reiterated with regard to all states to which they applied.

15. (S) The U.S. Delegation responded that the U.S. and Russian positions are consistent, and that a joint presentation was not necessary. Should Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine raise the issue within the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the U.S. and Russian Delegations could direct them to the April 1, 2009 joint statement by the Presidents that clearly stated that the new treaty would be a bilateral agreement. Discussion of security assurances was not appropriate within the JCIC.

RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S.
PAPER ON "ELEMENTS OF A
START FOLLOW-ON TREATY"

16. (S) Antonov made the following comments on the U.S. paper

concerning "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" presented to Russia during the May 19-20 meetings in Moscow (REF A):

- The U.S. and Russian proposals for Section I on General Obligations and Limitations were very close. However, use of the expression "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW)" by the United States throughout its paper raised questions. In addition, Russia's paper on "ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear Warheads" raised additional questions and Russia was eager for U.S. comments.

- Section II of the U.S. paper provided Central Limits and Counting Rules and represented a departure from START concepts. To a considerable extent the U.S. paper coincided with the October 23, 2008 U.S.-proposed agreement. In particular, it focused on limiting ODSNWs and placed non-nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems outside of the limitations of the treaty. This type of double accounting was counter-productive. Such an approach could have far-reaching, destabilizing effects with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. Russia tried to make this point in Moscow and hoped that the United States had considered Russia's perspective.

- The U.S. paper did not contain counting rules for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Overall, the U.S. paper was vague with regard to limitations on strategic delivery vehicles. Reductions on deployed missiles could continue but verification of the reductions would stop.

- The U.S. paper proposed limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, although launchers associated with the deployment of missiles not tested for nuclear weapon delivery would not be captured. Russia would like to discuss this further. Terminology may require further detail and coordination.

- Strategic delivery vehicles are an integral part of strategic offensive arms (SOAs). This position was included in Russia's December 15, 2008 paper (REF B). To be viable and effective, the new treaty should have verified reductions for strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads on them.

- The U.S.-proposed adaptation of START Treaty components, including procedures for elimination, notification,

verification, and the use of a JCIC-type body. The United States also proposed subsequent talks regarding disarmament. Russia believed it reasonable to discuss these issues in further detail after key provisions regarding the follow-on treaty were agreed.

- Regarding mobile missiles, Russia was proceeding from the understanding that there would not be specific limits on these types of missiles. Russia was against any limitations specific to mobile missiles.

- On May 20, 2009, Russia presented its position regarding Votkinsk (REF C). Again, Russia was sure that this issue must be closed by December 5, 2009. There was no room for maneuvering on this point. (Begin comment: This point was recorded as delivered, both through interpretation and in English by Antonov. The statement that the Votkinsk "issue must be closed" was slightly ambiguous in that it was a

different phrasing than used before. Previous statements in Moscow made it clear that Russia was insisting that the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility must be closed by December 5, 2009. End comment.)

- Finally, it was unreasonable to preserve obligations to exchange telemetric information under the new treaty.

¶7. (S) Antonov then provided the following comments on the U.S. Delegation paper, delivered on May 20, 2009, on the rationale for using verification measures to more closely correlate warheads and delivery vehicles (REF C):

- The U.S. paper touched upon a number of technical aspects regarding verification.

- The United States sought to unite limits on strategic nuclear warheads as under the Moscow Treaty with limits on strategic delivery vehicles as under START. However, the United States used the term ODSNW with regard to the strategic nuclear warhead limitations, which is a term recognized only by the United States.

- The United States did not believe that ICBMs and SLBMs should be subject to the treaty.

¶8. (S) Antonov provided the following comments on the U.S. points delivered in Moscow on the relationship between the Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-on treaty (REF C):

- Russia was proceeding from the basis of the tasking presented by the Russian and U.S. Presidents per their instructions issued on April 1, 2009. The Presidents were clear that Russia and the United States were to develop a new, full-scale legally-binding arrangement on reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms. Russia and the United States should be focused on this objective. In this regard, it was logical that the Moscow Treaty should cease to exist upon entry into force of the new treaty.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the Russian comments on the U.S. points and papers provided during the May 19-20 meetings in Moscow, and noted that Antonov's presentation, when combined with the additional feedback provided earlier

in the day, provided a thorough understanding of Russia's position.

FURTHER EXPLANATION
OF U.S. APPROACH

¶10. (S) Referring to the hybrid approach proposed by the United States, Gottemoeller made the following points to clarify the U.S. objective and rationale:

- START provided an excellent foundation for a new treaty.

At the same time, however, the United States and Russia had a different relationship than that which existed when START was negotiated: the United States and Russia were no longer in the grips of the Cold War, and were cooperating, even on strategic nuclear issues.

- Gottemoeller herself was insistent on the inclusion in the preamble of the U.S. "Elements" paper of the statement that the United States and Russia sought to bring their nuclear postures "into alignment with our post-Cold War relationship -- no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and cooperating where mutually advantageous," and was pleased that Russia's vision for the new treaty adopted this and other points.

- This was the basis of the hybrid approach: the United States wanted to take advantage of the proven worth of START, both conceptually and experientially, but wanted also to take advantage of experience gained by the Moscow Treaty, which focused more on the operational capability of each Side.

- She understood the Russian concern that operational capabilities represented only a piece of the equation, and that non-deployed missiles could still pose a threat. For that reason, the United States was intent on addressing this in the new treaty and working on ideas for transparency and confidence-building measures to ameliorate these concerns. This would be an ongoing dialogue, as the United States was still considering within its own Government specific verification and transparency measures.

U.S. COMMENTS ON RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE MOSCOW TREATY AND
THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY

¶11. (S) Gottemoeller asked Brown to provide additional comments regarding the relationship between the Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-on Treaty. Brown made the following points:

- The U.S. Delegation paper provided in Moscow presented options on the relationship between the Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-on Treaty.

- There was no requirement that a subsequent agreement supersede the Moscow Treaty. Per Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Moscow Treaty, the Moscow Treaty "may" be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. Unlike START, the Moscow Treaty did not specify that the subject of a subsequent treaty be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Thus, the United States and Russia had complete freedom with regard to superseding the Moscow Treaty by the START Follow-on Treaty.

- The position presented by Russia earlier in the day was clear. From his perspective as a legal advisor, the Russian approach was the most elegant approach; it would be difficult to manage those elements of the Moscow Treaty that should remain in force together with a START Follow-on Treaty. There would be issues concerning definitions and various other provisions. Thus, the Russian approach was the simplest path forward.

¶12. (S) Responding to Brown's comments, Kotkova concurred from a Russian legal perspective; supersession of the Moscow Treaty was the simplest approach, though creating additional

articles in the new treaty to deal with a continuing relationship to the Moscow Treaty would be more challenging and, thus, interesting for lawyers. Since the new treaty would be short, however, a short statement regarding the relationship, i.e., supersession, made the most sense.

U.S. COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN PAPERS
PROVIDED IN MOSCOW CONCERNING THE
DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR WARHEADS

¶13. (S) Warner commented on views expressed in two of the papers Russia had provided to the United States in Moscow regarding potential U.S. plans for equipping ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. Russia's paper entitled "ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear Warheads" presented two arguments. First, the paper argued that proceeding with the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs would be de-stabilizing, and could spark a new arms race involving other countries. Second, however, was the idea that if such warheads were deployed they should be considered nuclear. In Russia's second set of opening remarks presented in Moscow, Russia argued that the new treaty should make it impermissible to convert for nuclear armaments ICBMs and SLBMs that had been developed for non-nuclear armaments.

¶14. (S) Warner continued that, regardless of the three somewhat different positions expressed by Russia, the United States still held a different position. The parties to the new treaty should have as an option the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on strategic offensive missiles, and these warheads should not count against the ceiling on nuclear warheads. The United States was prepared to discuss verification measures to enable the sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear warheads on strategic offensive missiles, and recognized that the U.S. and Russian positions reflected important differences that required negotiation.

¶15. (S) Antonov responded that this was one of the fundamental differences between the United States and Russia, and Russia would like a better understanding of U.S. plans with regard to the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on strategic systems. While Russia's early warning capabilities would improve over time, they would never be able to determine whether a missile in flight was armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Any launch of an ICBM or SLBM would be considered to involve a nuclear warhead, in the same manner as had been described by the United States in the past with regard to the U.S. position. Russia had considered various approaches to this problem with respect to the new treaty, but required a better understanding of U.S. plans in order to develop an approach. If the United States only intended to deploy 20 such systems, then counting their warheads as nuclear would not impact overall strategic potential if the limit for nuclear warheads were 1,700, and it would make accounting and verification much simpler. Without clarification regarding U.S. plans, however, Russia assumed the United States was attempting something behind its back.

¶16. (S) Antonov asked about use controls for conventional

ICBMs and SLBMs, questioning whether they would be at the same standard as controls for nuclear weapons, and questioning who would have the authority to approve their use. Russia wanted to engage in a dialogue on the subject and was frustrated that when it expressed its concerns in the past it had been told that its concerns were not serious. He suggested that U.S. Government officials often argued that Russia's concerns were not serious but then once out of government and working as non-governmental organization (NGO) experts, they changed their position, suggesting that as government experts they were pursuing a policy and not seriously analyzing Russia's concerns. Russia's approach to this was simply to prohibit such weapons. In this way Russia's concerns would not just be "allayed" as the United States had sought before; they would be eliminated. The issue did require more discussion, but it needed to be resolved.

¶17. (S) Gottemoeller replied that changes in views as

officials left government and began work at NGOs was one issue, and that changes in Administrations was another and, in fact, was an advantage in the democratic process that enabled new ideas into government thinking. The United States was engaged in reviews of previous policy, seeking to identify new ideas and good ideas from the past. However, to be clear, the U.S.-proposed draft agreement of October 23, 2008 was not a basis for the U.S. current position on a START Follow-on Treaty.

¶18. (S) Antonov responded that he appreciated the processes of U.S. policy development. "e noted that, with regard to missile defense, there had been a lot of news about the "third site" in Europe and some investigations into its financing, and that some of the plans are being frozen or postponed. However, what he did not want to see with regard to this was Washington only making a half decision by just freezing the funding that was proposed for a third missile defense site in Europe. A better approach would be to completely reject the third site; cutting funding may allay some concerns but by itself did not eliminate them. A decision to eliminate this site would make the START Follow-on Treaty negotiations much easier.

BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE

¶19. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the United States had studied Russia's paper entitled "Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine." The issue of these countries' intentions and objectives touched on U.S. nuclear policy and was an aspect of the Nuclear Posture Review. At the JCIC, and in bilateral meetings, the United States had told these countries that the 1994 Budapest security assurances remained in force. The United States did not believe it was necessary to make a joint U.S.-Russian presentation to these countries at the upcoming JCIC; the United States and Russia could continue to make their points independently, though their positions were the same. The United States believed that the concerns of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had been allayed. Gottemoeller asked whether Russia had heard otherwise.

¶20. (S) Antonov responded that he was in close contact with

his counterparts in these countries and, in every context they raised the issue of both the security assurances and their participation in the START Follow-on Treaty. Ukraine, in particular, argued that because they were not party to any military-political bloc they should have security assurances from the major military powers, especially the P-5. Russia had rejected this because Ukraine had received assurances as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Russia insisted that there were no different classes for security guarantees; all non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT had received them. Informally he suggested that, when a new treaty is signed, Russia and the United States could issue a joint statement that expressed appreciation for the removal of nuclear weapons from their territory, and their contribution to the NPT. Language could also be considered for the preamble of the new treaty.

¶21. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the United States had been considering this issue in the context of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The notion of a joint statement upon treaty signature was interesting and should be considered further.

¶22. (S) Antonov responded that Russia was prepared to address the issue of security assurances at the NPT, but in the context of all NPT states. He suggested that, should Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine sense a difference in the U.S. and Russian approaches, they would try to pull Russia and the United States apart, so it was important that the two countries be united in their position. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine would surely raise the issue at the JCIC, so it was important that the United States and Russia coordinate a response.

¶23. (S) Gottemoeller affirmed that the United States would continue to express its commitment to the 1994 Budapest Statement. As for their involvement in START Follow-on, Presidents Obama and Medvedev already made clear in their April 1, 2009 joint statement that the new treaty would be a bilateral agreement. If the issue were raised in the JCIC, the heads of the U.S. and Russian Delegations could refer to the April 1 Joint Statement. Otherwise it was not a JCIC issue.

¶24. (S) Subsequent to the meeting, the Russian Delegation provided a written copy of their paper "On Comments on the U.S. Documents during the First Round of Negotiations." That translation will be provided septel (SFO-GVA-I-003).

¶25. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian Paper on "How the Russian Side Envisions the New START Treaty," dated June 1, 2009.

¶26. (U) Participants.

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau

Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Dr. Look
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Ubeev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Lakeev (Int)

¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA